Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency is omnipotent domestically. This is the central idea of this book. Kiessling lived in Pakistan for thirteen years from 1989 to 2002, including four years in Quetta and nine in Islamabad. The book is an attempt to collect and present information (history, its origin and development, tasks and objectives, successes and failures of ISI) chronologically. However, the scope of study is from 1948 to 2011, though the events of 2014 are also included. To fulfil the need of primary research, Kiessling conducted interviews, though he also took the help of secondary research sources ranging from books, newspapers, periodicals to websites, to strengthen his account.Generally, the book is more narrative or descriptive in nature than it is exploratory or analytical. The overwhelming focus of the book is ISI’s role in Pakistan’s domestic realm, as out of 246 pages, fewer than 30 are on foreign issues. Though the book sends more information to an international reader about Pakistan, the book is no short of revealing attention-grabbing information for a Pakistani reader.ISI is bornOn page 14, Kiessling writes: “The founding father of the ISI is considered to be [Australian born British Army officer, Major General] Walter Joseph Cawthorne, who headed the ISI from January to June 1948 [as its first Director].” Cawthorne drew up ISI’s initial organizational structure and functional areas, as an inter-services organization, which reflected his own job of forging a liaison between the Ministry of Defence and the three Services Headquarters. Cawthorne opted to serve the state of Pakistan after partition in 1947, and he was promoted from Major General to Deputy Chief of Staff in 1951. Cawthorne was the first military man leading ISI as its Director. The tradition of ISI being headed by a military officer (as its Director General or DG) is still followed, though now a military officer can be a serving or retired one.For better understanding, the rest of the discussion is parsed into four main themes and each theme will be discussed separately.Theme One: ISI is a functional successor of Intelligence Bureau (IB)ISI can be called a functional successor of a civilian intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau (IB). On page 13, Kiessling writes: “The ISI was established in 1948 and is generally described as a consequence of the first Pakistan-India war over Kashmir, where there were supposedly substantial reconnaissance gaps on the Pakistan side.” Further, on pages 16 and 17, Kiessling writes: “Cawthorne’s composition of ISI included not only military but also Muslim civilian personnel from the former Indian Intelligence Bureau. These civilian experts formed the backbone of the ISI in its early years…The initial tasks of the new agency were intelligence (reconnaissance) work outside Pakistan’s borders in India and Kashmir…But internally, apart from the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir, the ISI had no intelligence mandate.” In this way, contrary to the claims of Sean P. Winchell (mentioned in his article, “Pakistan’s ISI: The Invisible Government” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Vol. 16. No. 3, Fall, 2003), it is not that the failure of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) of Pakistan in the first Indo-Pak war (1947-48) to amass correct information led to the formation of ISI but it is that, despite all its intelligence expertise, being a civilian intelligence agency, the IB was found handicapped in an external war zone. The intelligence gathering expertise of the officials of the IB was still required to contribute to the growth of ISI as an intelligence agency ready to meet the needs of an external war theatre in the future. Hence, by the 1950s, Pakistan had two intelligence agencies: ISI for external intelligence; and IB for internal intelligence.It is a myth that the martial law of General Ayub Khan induced the domestic role of ISI. Instead, the monopoly on information helped General Ayub Khan, the C-in-C, utilize the services of ISI years before he imposed the first martial law on Pakistan. On page 19, Kiessling writes: “[General] Ayub Khan later admitted spying on Prime Minister Feroz Noon, justifying it with his [General’s] concerns about extending his [General’s] service, due to expire in 1959.” The primary duty of ISI was to help General Ayub consolidate his martial law by keeping military and political opponents under observation.The diversion of attention from external to internal realm affected the performance of ISI externally (and also of MI), as depicted in the failure of ‘Operation Gibraltar’ or in its extension ‘Operation Grand Slam’ leading to the 1965 war with India. On page 23, Kiessling writes: “Later on, in discussions with Ayub Khan, ISI Director Riaz Hussain is said to have justified their failure with the words, ‘All these years were not doing our real work of counterintelligence, because we were too busy chasing your domestic political opponents.”Instead of holding ISI accountable, later on, the civilian head (Prime Minister) made it more powerful and participatory. On page 26, Kiessling writes: “After Cawthorne’s leadership in 1948, the directorship of the ISI was generally held by a brigadier [or a Major General]. The service was regarded as relatively small and compact. But after the failures of Operations Gibraltar and Grand Slam, it was felt that the ISI needed a stronger leadership. Even more so, after the final loss of East Pakistan, the new President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto realized that the dejected military leadership needed a boost in self-confidence. So in the 1970s for the first time the ISI was headed by a three-star general.” This is how, in December 1971, President Bhutto made Lt. General Ghulam Jilani Khan the first Lt. General as DG ISI.Theme Two: ISI found a domestic competitor in IBOn the domestic front, ISI carved out its way between the domains of IB and MI, though functionally ISI remained closer to MI than IB. Interestingly, ISI can be considered a functional extension of IB, but they both grew into an intense competition with each other. Domestically, in 1951, IB achieved another feat by discovering a conspiracy within the domain of the armed forces. On page 44, Kiessling writes: “After January 1951, beginning with [General] Ayub Khan, a Pakistani served as head of an Army, which was still being established. From the outset he was confronted with a political coup attempt, known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy. This was uncovered by the IB and not the ISI, and included a major general, some brigadiers and colonels as well as a commander of the Air Force, all of whom were dissatisfied with the course of political developments since 1948.”However, in 1973, it was the turn of ISI to outshine IB. On pages 36 and 37, Kiessling writes: “In 1973 there was a conspiracy among young officers of the Army and Air Force who blamed [Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto and the generals for the loss of East Pakistan and their defeat by India. They succeeded in persuading a brigadier and a colonel to lead their plot but the ISI received well-timed information about the case, which came to be known as the Attock Conspiracy, and observed the group for months undercover until they struck.”The excellence of both IB and ISI were appreciated. On pages 36 and 37, Kiessling writes: “In 1975, through a directive from the Prime Minister’s office, the ISI was boosted by the setting up of an internal political cell. The cell, already secretly installed by Ayub Khan, was now formally endorsed and expanded quickly. Bhutto then allowed the IB to furnish a parallel special cell, in order to be informed about tendencies and developments within the military…”Theme Three: Counter-insurgency offers ISI a challengeIn the face of staunch Bengali ethnic nationalism, the first ever counter-insurgency function of ISI failed in East Pakistan. The staunch Bengali nationalism offered little space to ISI operatives to penetrate the ranks of ethnic nationalist, whether or not they were siding with Mukti Bahini (a popular Bengali term to describe the guerilla resistance movement or insurgency launched to make East Pakistan independent in 1971). After 1971, the turn of West Pakistan came. Ethnic nationalism in East Pakistan also fanned ethnic nationalism in West Pakistan, which also started slipping into the abyss of ethnic nationalism. The immediate reason was that the new law regarding the mining of natural resources led to ethnic rising in Baluchistan against the central government in the late 1970. A kind of mutual animosity appeared between pro-centre tribes of Jamoto, Zehir and Bugti, and anti-centre tribes of Marri, Bizenjo and Mengal. The latter were running the provincial government. On page 33, Kiessling writes: “In February 1973, a large cache of weapons was found in the Iraqi embassy [discovered by ISI’s Major Shahid Tirmizi], destined for the Marri tribe. Bhutto accused his opponents in Baluchistan of having separatist intentions and dissolved the provincial parliament. Nawab Akbar Bugti, Chief of the Bugti tribes, was appointed governor, which the Marris and Mengals saw as a betrayal. They reacted with intensified rebellion, and in solidarity with them the North-West Frontier Province [which is today’s Khyber Pakhtunkhawa (KPK)] government also resigned…In neighbouring Afghanistan these events were followed with great interest. The Durand Line was never recognized as the state border by Kabul and there were dreams of a greater Afghanistan which would include all of Pakistan’s Pashtun areas. The rebellious groups in Baluchistan were soon receiving covert assistance from Kabul [including the KGB and KHAD].” There were reports of infiltration by terrorists from across the Pak-Afghan border into Pakistan. An insurgency was also expected in NWFP along ethnic lines.In response, the Pakistan government sprang into action to discourage Kabul from interfering in Baluchistan and NWFP. On page 34, Kiessling writes: “One consequence of the Baluchistan events was the creation of a Special Operations Bureau in the ISI in 1973, which later became the cradle of the legendary Afghanistan Office… The era of the ISI’s actions in Afghanistan now began. A first large-scale operation in 1975 was the encouragement of a rebellion in the Panjshir valley. Though unsuccessful, Kabul [or Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan, the first President of Afghanistan from 1973 to 1978] realized it [or he] could ill afford to underestimate the Pakistan card.” In this way, the lesson learnt in East Pakistan before December 1971 (when the fall of Dhaka took place) helped ISI suppress insurgencies in the western half of West Pakistan after 1972. Nevertheless, to do that ISI had to transcend the Pak-Afghan border. This is how the history of the Afghanistan office in ISI began. It was the Afghanistan Office or the Afghanistan Bureau that swelled in size and ability compared to ISI’s rest of the bureaus.Theme Four: ISI’s yearning for controlling the political systemThis theme comprises six main publicly known episodes from 1988 to 2014 depicting ISI’s craving for regulating the political system.1. The formation of IJIAfter the death of General Zia-ul-Haq in August 1988, the foremost objective before the military-ISI blend was to influence the post-martial law political system. The mode was to create a parliament that could be balanced (not swinging into one political party’s favour), thereby amenable to external manoeuvering. The fear struck the military-ISI composite was that Benazir Bhutto’s political party, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), could secure an overwhelming majority. From pages 75 to 77, Kiessling writes: “DG ISI Hamid Gul …together with Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmed and Major Aamer from the Internal Security Wing of the ISI …cobbled together the party alliance that became known as Islami Jamoori Ithad (‘Islamic Democratic Alliance’, IJI, comprising nine parties including Pakistan Muslim League; PML, and Jamaat-e-Islami; JI) as a political counterweight to the PPP… to avoid a one-sided distribution of political power… On 14 November 1988 [however] the PPP became the largest party in the National Parliament [with 93 seats].” The IJI with 54 seats remained confined to Punjab. The PPP became able to form a coalition government with the help of small political parties and independent parliamentarians in the total house of 207 seats.2. The Midnight Jackal affairIn June 1989, Benazir Bhutto removed General Hamid Gul from the position of DG ISI on the military fiasco in Jalalabad in 1989. In his place, the retired Lt. General Shamsur Rahman Kallue was made DG ISI without consulting COAS General Beg. This was the first time a retired general was made DG ISI and that without consulting GHQ. The civil-military tension shaped through the formation of IJI embraced a new spike of acrimony.Two reactions appeared. First, DG ISI was denied participation in regular military meetings and decisions, thereby closing the door of inside information from military to the political government. Second, an attempt was made by the remnants of General Gul to bring a vote of no confidence against the government of Benazir Bhutto. On page 83, Kiessling writes: “The entire drama unfolded in September and October 1989. The first part of the “Midnight Jackal” affair was the attempt by two ISI officers to bribe government parliamentarians to cast their votes against the Benazir Bhutto government in an upcoming vote of no confidence…In the second act of the drama, the government tried to catch the culprits with the help of the IB…The two culprits offering bribes were Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmed and Major Mohammed Aamer, both still active in the army.” This attempt to bring the government down was constructed on the ruse of religion and the same context was used to collect money to bribe politicians of the Opposition. The plan was thwarted by IB by video recording meetings of the opposition hobnobbing with the two ISI men who were offering bribes to their targets to make the vote of no confidence successful. Consequently, the government was saved and both officers were dismissed from the service for ‘retired on fault’. The whole episode made the PPP government distrustful of the military. Retrospectively, if IB had not come to the rescue of the PPP government, it would have not survived the vote of no confidence in the parliament.3. The Mehrangate scandalMoney was employed to manoeuver the 1990 elections. On page 119, Kiessling writes: “[T]he ISI’s directors, Asad Durrani and Javed Nasir, had deposited US $39 million in foreign currency reserves with the Mehran Bank [which was a private bank], through according to state regulations such funds should have been held exclusively in a national bank…The malpractice surfaced when the ISI’s Lt. Gen. Javed Ashraf, who had succeeded Javed Nasir as DG ISI, wanted to transfer the funds to another bank in January 1993. Yunus Habib [the Chief Operating Officer of the bank] was at first unable to comply, and later could pay only in instalments…In the process the name of the former Army chief Mirza Aslam Beg was mentioned, who confirmed a donation from Yunus Habib of 140 million rupees (then about US$4 million) made in favour of an election cell within the Presidency [when Ghulam Ishaq Khan was the President].” The scandal was called the Mehrangate and this scandal smeared the names of both General Beg and General Durrani.4. The Judges scandalThe judges of the Supreme Court are already considered pro-military and each time they acted under the ‘doctrine of necessity’ to validate martial laws. The year 2007 was no exception. On page 200, Kiessling writes: “In mid November [2007], a complaint was lodged at the Supreme Court against Musharraf’s re-election as President [held in October 2007]. The judges were to vote on the issue, so the ISI launched a surreptitious campaign of persuasion. At least three judges received secretly taped videos in which they were shown in compromising situations with certain ladies. The ladies, who were sent by the ISI, had been given as ‘thank you gifts’ by clients for services performed, and the judges had happily helped themselves. There were also sensitive videos pertaining to the daughters of other judges. The message was clear: that a positive vote was expected. As it turned out, the court judgement went in their favour; the ISI had won its campaign.” This is how General Musharraf secured his presidential position, but both the judges and ISI lost their face.5. The Memogate scandalThe proverbial Damocles’ sword always hung over the neck of politicians. On page 228, Kiessling writes: “Memogate was a case in which DG ISI [Ahmad Shuja] Pasha also came under fire. The main character in this scandal was Mansoor Ijaz, an American citizen of Pakistani descent. In September 2011 Ijaz brought the public’s attention to a letter which he claimed was written on the insistence of former Ambassador [Hussain] Haqqani and passed to Admiral Mike Mullen in Washington. The tenor of the letter was that President [Asif] Zardari feared an impending military takeover was asking for help from Washington to prevent this. In the new democratic Pakistan, Memogate quickly became a national affair, especially since Ijaz then claimed that Pasha had visited Arab countries seeking their consent to a planned military coup.” Consequently, DG ISI General Pasha was relieved of his post in March 2012 and on advice of COAS General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, General Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi was appointed next DG ISI (March 2012-September 2014), whereas new COAS General Raheel Sharif was appointed in November 2013.6. The Third-Empire affairThe yearning for controlling the political system is difficult to die. On pages 233 and 234, Kiessling writes: “[T]he role of the ISI during the PTI [the Pakistan Tehrek-e-Insaf of Imran Khan] and PAT [Pakistan Awami Tehrik of Allama Tahir-ul-Qadri] demonstrations in Islamabad from August 2014 onwards remains unclear even today. Local political observers have little doubt that the agency was backing it, in spirit and financially. For them the countdown to the whole operation had already begun during Shuja Pasha’s term in office; they see him as its godfather. This view gets credit from the fact that Pasha, already retired and living in Dubai, came over to Pakistan in October 2014 to meet Khan at the house of PTI member Shafqat Mahmood…What part was played by DG ISI Zaheer-ul Islam during the demonstrations is still unknown. Realizing that neither camp was able to bring the proposed one million people on to the streets, he might have – in accordance with the COAS – backtracked and advised both Imran Khan and Tahir-ul-Qadri to steer their followers away from violence and to let the whole undertaking peter out slowly.” On their way from Lahore to Islamabad, both parties kept on mentioning a third-empire who would raise finger against the sitting government. Everyone knew that Khan and Qadri were referring to the COAS [General Raheel Sharif] and inciting him to topple the elected government of Nawaz Sharif. The journey and then sit-in of both the PTI and PAT were expensive to afford. On page 244, Kiessling writes: “In Islamabad a few thousand followers of Imran Khan (PTI) and Tahir-ul-Qadri (PAT) continued their demonstrations till October 2014…During the siege of Islamabad the nucleus of both camps of protestors were paid a modest daily allowance. Political analysts are still asking where this money came from… Due to lack of political alternatives, Pakistan’s military finally did not wish to overthrow the Nawaz Sharif government. But their aim, to weaken the Prime Minister, had been fully achieved.”CriticismThroughout the book, Kiessling is found making an obvious attempt to sensationalize the role of ISI in two main ways. First, Kiessling has made an effort to tie ISI’s role to the Kashmir uprising of 1947 and the late 1980s, the Afghan unrest of the late 1970s, and the Khalistan movement of the 1980s. If the criterion were instigation, nowhere in the book has Kiessling come up with any evidence of ISI’s role in the instigation of these movements. Nevertheless, if ISI’s role in the initiation of these movements were accepted, such an avowal would be a great insult to those who launched these movements indigenously to meet their own objectives. Even today, the extant movements are in the control of locals. As mentioned earlier, the main focus of Kiessling’s book is ISI’s role in domestic issues, since out of 246 pages of the book, fewer than 30 are on foreign issues. Certainly, Kiessling needs more background study on these movements to make his final remarks. Second, Kiessling has made an effort to implicate ISI’ role in heinous incidents (such as Mumbai bombings and attacks, 9/11 events and the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan) happened regionally and internationally. Kiessling made this attempt by relying on two things. First, links and speculations. That is, one person is linked to another and then to another and then to any known official of ISI and hence the speculation that there must be information and that the information might have been passed on. Second, claims of terrorists captured. That is, after the arrest, a terrorist confessed to have connections in ISI. Both these points, the speculation and the claim, need verification for their validity. Unfortunately, the book offers no verification at all.The era from 1979 to 1989 was the golden era of ISI because of two reasons. First, ISI was supported from both internally and externally to enhance its role in Afghanistan. Second, the lengthy tenure of General Rehman (1980-1987) as DG ISI offered ISI stability and consistency, especially when this tenure coincided with the tenure of COAS-cum-President General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). The era is inimitable now, as the ground realities have changed forcing ISI to readjust its own goals and objectives. The slurring and demeaning consequent to the formation of IJI, the Midnight Jackal affair, the Mehrangate scandal, the Judges scandal, the Memogate scandal, and the Third-Empire affair are a testament to the fast receding role of ISI, along with the military, in the political affairs of Pakistan.ISI can no more make or break political governments. Compared to the past, ISI is almost out of political scene, especially in the face of growing awareness in the masses and in political parties. With the political system gaining strength, there are possibilities that IB will garner more strength domestically than ISI. The internal political wing of ISI may persist, but it will have to sweat blood for its survival.